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Culpable Mistakes in Rape: Eliminating
the Defense of Unreasonable Mistake of
Fact as to Victim Consent
I. Introduction
Despite years of discussion, dispute, and reform, the laws gov-
erning rape1 remain controversial. Myths about rape fuel this contro-
versy and encourage rhetorical debate. One writer characterizes rape
as "a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all
women in a state of fear."2 Another asserts that rape is the result of
desires which, once aroused in a man, cannot be controlled and for
which women are to blame.' Some others claim that rape laws re-
flect legislative and judicial distrust of all women,4 the purported jus-
1. This comment deals primarily with the law of forcible rape. Intercourse through
fraud, statutory rape, and intercourse with unconscious, mentally or physically incapacitated,
or drugged women will not be considered or discussed.
Similarly, although females are considered capable of committing sex offenses upon
males, People v. Reilly, 85 Misc. 2d 702, 381 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1976), such offenses are uncom-
mon and this comment will not discuss them. Rather, the comment will address the more
prevalent situation in which a male has forcible, nonconsensual intercourse with a woman who
is not his spouse. Thus, when reference is made to the victim it will be in the feminine gender;
references to the defendant will be in the masculine.
2. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 15 (1975) (emphasis in original). In a re-
cent interview, Brownmiller conceded that the sentiment was carelessly phrased. Rather, she
explained that she intended to convey that all men profit from rape because it keeps all women
in fear and thus less likely to defy male dominance. The Comeback of Womanly Wiles, TIME,
January 30, 1984, at 82.
3. McLaughlin, The Sex Offender, 29 POLICE CHIEF 26, 28 (1962). The police have
been the target of severe criticism regarding their attitude toward rape victims. One commen-
tator who examined record books at a New York City police station and expressed surprise at
the low number of arrests following reported rapes was told by a policeman that the reported
rapes were merely the complaints of prostitutes who had not been paid. S. BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL 365-66 (1975). Whether this experience is typical is questionable, as
reports based on extensive client counseling of rape victims reveal that a majority of women at
rape crises centers felt the police had treated them well. One report, written by counselors at
Boston City Hospital, notes that the victim of a recent rape is so overwrought that normal
actions or statements seem to be threats of assault. Women who are confronted with police
when in this hypersensitive condition may feel hostile or humiliated at first, but following
subsequent dealings with the police, often express surprise at their initial reaction. A. BURGESS
& L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS AND RECOVERY 87 (1979).
4. One commentator interviewed 38 Philadelphia judges with experience in rape trials
in an effort to determine judicial attitudes toward rape victims. In concluding that the judges
were far less impartial than is commonly believed, the writer cited the complexity of rape trials
and the fear of committing the "worst error [in] the criminal justice system" -convicting an
innocent man - as the cause of judicial skepticism toward rape allegations. Bohmer, Judicial
Attitudes Toward Rape Victims in FORCIBLE RAPE 163 (1977).
tification being that the nature of the crime requires close scrutiny of
the alleged victim's complaint so that an unjustly accused defendant
may be protected.'
While protecting the wrongly accused defendant is an essential
attribute of the criminal justice system, it is but one goal of the
multi-purposed rape laws; rape statutes are designed to both protect
women and convict those persons guilty of the crime.' To many,
these two objectives seemed irreconcilable. Reflected throughout the
legislative and adjudicatory history of rape laws is a fear that the
larger goal of protecting women will be achieved at the price of con-
victing some innocent men. This fear was most evident when rape
convictions routinely resulted in the death penalty or life imprison-
ment - sanctions so severe that courts focused almost exclusively on
protecting defendants. At times, courts' protective measures suc-
ceeded only in exacerbating the anguish of the victim.
Legislative responses to the perceived mistreatment of rape vic-
tims by the courts tended to overemphasize a need to vindicate the
women's rights.' Factions which urged greater protection for defen-
5. This rationale appears in innumerable discussions on rape laws. Sheldon Toll, an
eminent authority on criminal law in Pennsylvania, justifies the "reasonable victim" rule -
that a woman resist sexual assault with reasonable resolution - by stating:
The majority rule is probably related to the extreme penalties which follow a
rape conviction under present law; with so much at stake legislators and judges
were reluctant to permit a jury to convict a woman's testimony that she was
frightened into submission in circumstances where most women would not have
been intimidated.
S. TOLL, PENNSYLVANIA CRIME CODE ANNOTATED 367 (1974).
6. See Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 638, 640-48 (1976). Early English rape laws reflect a confused purpose, not entirely
vindication of a crime against a virgin's body or punishment of a crime against her father's
estate. During the reign of William the Conqueror the punishments were severe: castration and
loss of both eyes. These penalties, however, were only assessed for raping "virgins of property"
- a female who although she could not legally inherit land, would pass on her father's land by
marriage. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 25 (1975). The concept of virginity as prop-
erty lessened to some extent under King Henry II, although rape was still treated as an offense
more against property than against a person. The punishment provided by early Pennsylvania
law reflected this orientation:
That Whosoever Shall be Convicted of Rape of Ravishment, that is, forcing a
Maid, Widow, or Wife, Shall forefeit One third of his Estate to the parent of the
said maid, And if a Widow, to the said Widow, and if a Wife, to the husband of
the said Wife.
Act of December 7, 1782 ch. 10, [1682] Charter to Wm. Penn & Laws of the Province of
Pennsylvania 110 (1879). By 1718, the law in Pennsylvania defined offenses according to En-
glish common law, which under Elizabeth I had purged the property overtones from the rape
law. See Biener, Rape P National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 3 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 45, 48-49 (1976).
7. Some commentators contend that modern rape laws serve the function of providing
an orderly outlet for a man's hostility against the rapist who has "ravaged" or "despoiled" his
woman. See Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and
Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 73 (1952). Others state that a woman's
right to privacy and physical integrity is the principle of rape laws. See Comment, Shifting the
Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
143, 160 (1983). Still others, after examining the traditional definition of rape which deals
exclusively with penis-vaginal assault, concluded that rape laws seek to protect feminine chas-
dants and those which demanded less traumatic prosecutions for vic-
tims were able to agree on one point: the laws governing rape failed
to reach either goal. Rapes continued to go unreported,8 the inci-
dence of the crime increased dramatically,9 and the number of con-
victions remained low.' 0
Subsequently, various reforms have been adopted which attempt
to reduce the courts' scrutiny of the victim's behavior, thereby en-
couraging more victims to report rapes. 1' This shift in focus from the
victim to the defendant, however, has served only to intensify the
concern that innocent men may be convicted.
The conflict between punishing only the guilty and exacting ret-
ribution for the victim of a violent crime reaches its height when the
defendant alleges that he mistakenly believed that the victim con-
sented to sexual intercourse. In these cases, courts face an acute di-
lemma: to inflict a severe penalty on a defendant who lacks criminal
intent would defeat every purpose of punishment,"2 yet to free a de-
fendant who unreasonably formed the mistaken belief of consent
would afford no solice to the raped woman and would breed further
contempt for an already-embattled legal system.
Currently, great confusion surrounds the question of whether a
defendant's mistaken belief that a woman consented to intercourse
constitutes a defense to rape. Jury instructions on mistake vary
widely, and often only confuse the jurors and encourage mistrials. In
tity. See Comment, Reform Rape Legislation, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 183, 190 (1978).
8. One police officer hypothesized that 80% of all rapes go unreported. A. BURGESS &
L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS AND RECOVERY 92 (1979). Although exact figures are impossi-
ble to determine, the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics estimates that 55% of all rapes
are not reported to police. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 294 (1982).
9. The Uniform Crime Reports indicate that over an 11 year period (1971-1981), the
number of rapes committed increased 74%. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 9 (ANNUAL REPORT 1981).
Although this increase may be attributable to a greater willingness to report rapes, the consist-
ently high percentage of unreported rapes indicates that this is not the case.
The number of rapes committed in Australia rose dramatically during the eight years
following the closing of all houses of prostitution. Reports of rape increased 149% each year.
Geis, Forcible Rape: An Introduction in FORCIBLE RAPE 3 (1977). Clearly, any different
treatment of rape victims did not alone account for such an increase.
10. Although the precise figures for conviction rates vary among studies, they are al-
ways low. One study indicates a conviction rate of less than 2%. C. DEAN & M. DE BRUYN-
Kops, THE CRIME AND CONSEQUENCE OF RAPE 28 (1982).
11. See infra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
12. The purposes of punishment are typically divided into four categories: retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Crim-
inal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 84 (1908). However, some scholars of the criminal justice
system explain that the purpose of the criminal law is to define that conduct which is socially
unacceptable and hold it within limits which are reasonably tolerable. R. PERKINS CRIMINAL
LAW 5 (3d ed. 1982). Perkins states, "An incidental but very important function of the crimi-
nal law is to teach the difference between right and wrong." Id. at 6. Punishing a defendant,
then, who did not fully appreciate his behavior was wrongful would do nothing to deter socially
reprehensible conduct.
light of the turmoil surrounding the defense, this comment analyzes
recent developments in rape laws which emphasize the defendant's
conduct rather than the victim's conduct. The difficulty in ascribing
to the defendant a definite mental element is illustrated, followed by
an examination of the disparate treatment of the mistake defense in
both the United States and in England. Finally, this comment ad-
vances arguments to support abolition of the defense of unreasonable
mistake of fact as to victim consent.
II. Background
A. Rape Reform Laws - A Shift in Focus
Despite conflicting perspectives on the proper solution to the
rape problem, a3 many state legislators recently have attempted to re-
form their state's rape laws.14 Frequently, these changes have fo-
cused on evidentiary rules in rape trials.
One such change has been the enactment of rape shield laws
which enable the prosecutrix in a rape case to prevent the defense
from admitting as evidence her prior sexual activities.' 5 Additionally,
13. One feminist argues that the crime of rape should be put "in the assault category
because rape is clearly a form of assault. This is a neutral rule and . . . women should seek
neutral laws, not special laws which give us special protection." Wilson, Interview with a Fem-
inist Lawyer in RAPE: THE FIRST SOURCEBOOK FOR WOMEN 140 (1974).
Similarly, another commentator asserts that "rape should not be allowed to remain an
oddity in the criminal field: a fertile source of ill-considered deviations from standard proce-
dural and substantive law." Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (1977).
The New York Radical Feminists urge that psychological or biological rationalizations
should not mitigate the sentencing of convicted rapists. Connell, Feminist Action in RAPE: THE
FIRST SOURCEBOOK FOR WOMEN 268 app. (1974). The feminists suggest a number of "short-
range goals" designed to eliminate rape. They propose legal actions such as repealing laws that
criminalize fornication and homosexuality, and enacting laws penalizing men who "whistle at,
comment on, and touch us in the street." Id.
Conversely, Dean Wigmore quotes with approval Sir Matthew Hale:
The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in
the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or
the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing. The
real victim, however, too often is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy
naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to
such a plausable tale.
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 736 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
14. Most statutory reforms and changes in judicial interpretation of rape statutes oc-
curred within the last decade, perhaps resulting from the "changing outlook on women, or at
least a growth of political muscle brought to bear on 'women's issues.' " Berger, Man's Trial,
Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1977).
15. These laws have been enacted in various forms in at least 46 states, no doubt in
response to recent literature which almost uniformly advocates the adoption of rape shield
laws. See Ireland, Reform Rape Legislation: A New Standard of Sexual Responsibility, 49 U.
COLO. L. REV. 185, 190 (1978). Some writers do express greater reservation than others,
particularly in light of a defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him
and to produce witnesses in his behalf. See e.g., Note, Massachusetts Rape Shield Statute:
The Need to Balance the Defendant's Constitutional Rights with Victim Protections, 15 SUF-
FOLK U.L. REV. 1023 (1981).
some states have repealed the requirement of independent corrobora-
tion of victim allegations or rape.' 6 Furthermore, cautionary instruc-
tions that warn jurors that rape is a crime easily alleged and difficult
to refute have been abolished in many jurisdictions. 7
In addition to reforming the rules of evidence in rape prosecu-
tions, some states also have revised substantive provisions of rape
laws. Most notably, this has been accomplished by abolishing the
rule barring prosecution of a husband for forcible rape of his wife,' 8
an exemption from the law of rape since the seventeenth century. 9
One commentator asserts that many of the new rules which make prior sexual acts pre-
sumptively inadmissible have overcompensated for injustices caused by the old rules that ad-
mitted such evidence. Tanford & Boechino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amend-
ment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 551 (1980). See also Note, Indicia of Consent? A Proposal for
Change to the Common Law Rule Admitting Evidence of a Rape Victim's Character for
Chastity, 7 Loy. Ci. L.J. 118, 120 n.10 (1976); Rix, Rape Shield Statutes - Shield or
Sword, 69 WOMEN'S L.J. 13 (1983).
16. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-68 (West 1974) (repealed); DEL. CODE tit.
11, § 772(c) (1974) (repealed). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1777); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-69 (1972); VA. CODE § 18.2-69 (1975) (expressly requiring corroboration). Other juris-
dictions have eliminated the requirement of corroboration through case law. See United States
v. Ashe, 478 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v. Collins, 21 I11. App. 3d 800, 315 N.E.2d
916 (1974). The corroboration requirement is unique to rape laws and has created an almost
insurmountable barrier for the prosecution: the very nature of the crime results in assaults
where only the defendant and his accuser are present.
Other states have adopted statutes specifically stating that no corroboration is necessary.
E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-25 (Supp.
1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.15 (McKinney 1975) (repealed 1972); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3106 (Purdon 1983); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (Vernon Supp. 1976);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150 (1977).
17. 1976 IOWA LEGIS. SERV. 594 (West); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West. Cum.
Supp. 1977); 3106 (Purdon 1983). Those jurisdictions which no longer use cautionary instruc-
tions typically abandoned them under the premise that they are outmoded and reflect the
dated attitude that juries must be patronized. Ireland, Reform Rape Legislation. A New Stan-
dard of Sexual Responsibility, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 185, 198 (1978).
One cautionary instruction which was held to be "unsuitable to modern justice" stated:
Evidence was received for the purpose of showing that the female person
named in the information was a woman of unchaste character.
A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape but it
may be inferred that a woman who has previously consented to sexual inter-
course would be more likely to consent again.
Such evidence may be considered by you only for such bearing as it may
have on the question of whether or not she gave her consent to the alleged sexual
act and in judging her credibility.
Committee on Standard Jury Instructions of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cali-
fornia Jury Instructions, Criminal No. 10.06 (3d ed. 1970). This instruction was abolished in
People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975). The court
reasoned that since the alleged rapist's past remains inadmissible evidence, the victim in a rape
case should enjoy the same protection.
18. Although the majority of state statutes continue to define rape as forcible sexual
intercourse by a man with a woman not his wife, a growing majority permit prosecutions of a
husband for rape of his wife. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(a) (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(b) (West Sup. 1981) (exemption removed only from first degree rape);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1-709.10 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (1983); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.341-609.351 (West Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-408.01 to 28-
408.05 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 8632-AS (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b)
(West Supp. 1981); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.05 (1979). See generally Comment, The Marital
Rape Exemption in Pennsylvania: "With this Ring..., 86 DICK. L. REV. 79 (1981).
19. The commonly cited rationale for the exemption dates back to the writings of the
Terminology defining rape also has been updated, reflecting so-
ciety's changing attitudes toward sex.20 Similarly, gender neutral
statutes have been introduced, conforming the language used in rape
laws with that used in defining other crimes.21
The legislative purpose behind these reforms varies, yet their ef-
fect has been the same; they turn the attention of the judiciary from
the actions of the victim to those of the defendant. Rather than di-
recting rape laws solely toward protecting the defendant from
fabricated allegations, these reformed laws are designed to mitigate
the jury's exacting scrutiny of the victim. 2 Legislative redefinition of
consent provides the clearest illustration of reforms which shift the
law's focus from the victim to the accused.
B. Treatment of the Consent Standard
Once state statutes had codified the common law definition of
rape, providing that intercourse be accomplished "by force" and
"against the will" of the woman,23 courts struggled to determine
seventeenth century jurist, Lord Matthew Hale:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given
up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.
M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628, 629 (1847). See generally Neville, Rape in Early En-
glish Law, 121 JUST. P. 223 (1957).
20. A number of states which had defined rape in terms of "unlawful carnal
knowledge" replaced this phrase with "sexual assault." See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145
(CRIM. SUPP. 1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1801 to -1809 (ARK. CRIM. CODE SUPP. 1976);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010 to .130 (Vernon 1978).
See also infra note 23.
21. Gender neutral statutes are perhaps a response to equal protection arguments made
by defendants protesting rape laws which limit protection to females. See People v. McDonald,
86 Mich. App. 5, 272 N.W.2d 179 (1978); Brooks v. State, 24 Md. 334, 330 A.2d 670 (1978).
These arguments, however, have typically failed since classification of sexual status is reasona-
bly related to the objective of rape statute. See Note, Gender-based Statutory Rape Legisla-
tion and the Equal Protection Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99 (1981). See generally Annot.,
99 A.L.R.3d 129 (1980).
22. Juries typically consider extraneous matters such as whether the victim entered a
bar by herself, whether she accepted a ride with a casual male acquaintance or stranger,
whether she lived with a man to whom she was not married, and whether she had been drink-
ing. Wood, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View in RAPE: THE FIRST
SOURCEBOOK FOR WOMEN 185 n.25 (1974). One study concluded that when a flaw in the
victim's character is revealed, a jury will more likely sympathize with the defendant than with
the complainant. Wood recounts the following case:
[A] woman was beaten, raped, and sodomized by four men in an apartment
where she had been brought at gunpoint. The defense counsel won the case upon
the grounds that both his client, who was the tenant at the apartment where the
complainant had been raped, and the prosecutrix were sexual libertines. At the
trial he destroyed the victim's reputation, revealing that she was a divorcee
whose children were in a foster home, that she had had numerous affairs, and
that she was living illicitly with a man at the time of trial.
Id. at 148.
23. At common law, rape was defined as carnal knowledge by a man of a woman not
his wife, by force and against her will. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 197 (3d ed. 1982). One of
the basic differences between statutes which create crimes and statutes which codify common
law offenses is their construction: courts interpret the latter according to their common law
what constituted consent: was a woman's consent evidenced by her
failure to resist, or did consent require an affirmative act by the wo-
man indicating her willingness to have intercourse? Some courts re-
lied on medical data which indicated that a woman of average
strength could pose insurmountable obstacles to all sexual assaults
save the most overpowering. 4 Other courts attempted to discern the
willingness of a woman to have intercourse by relying on writings of
sexual behaviorists who themselves clearly indicated the difficulty of
determining whether consent had been given.
2 6
To establish greater certainty and consistency in ascertaining
consent, courts began to treat a woman's resistance as the outward
manifestation of the absence of her consent .2  This standard, how-
ever, presented problems as perplexing as those which had existed
before. Some jurisdictions imposed a requirement that the woman
resist to the utmost extent possible.2 7 This placed a two-fold burden
meaning and the former according to their everyday meaning. Accordingly, with common law
statutes, the statutory language acts only to inscribe the common law - sometimes inexpertly
- and as a result of judicial interpretation, the statute may acquire a meaning different from
that which is at first apparent. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 74 (1972).
Pennsylvania first drafted its rape statute in common law terms in 1860. The codification
introduced the phrase "unlawful carnal knowledge" and omitted the victim's status of "wife,
widow, or maid" contained in 1682 codification. Act of December 7, 1682, ch. 9 [1682] Char-
ter to Wm. Penn & Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania 110 (1879). The Code of 1860
stated:
If any person shall have unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and
against her will; . . . such person shall be adjudged guilty of felonious rape, and
on conviction be sentenced to pay a fine, not exceeding one thousand dollars; and
to undergo an imprisonment . ..not exceeding 15 years.
Act of March 31, 1860, Pub. L. No. 405, § 91 in I A Digest of Laws of Pennsylvania from
1700-1883, at 432 (1lth ed. rev. by F.C. Brighton, 1885).
24. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536
(1906) concluded that only "the most vehement exercise of every physical means of faculty
within the woman's power to resist penetration of her body" demonstrated her lack of consent.
To support this standard, the court stated that "medical writers insist that these obstacles
[hands, limbs, and pelvic muscles] are practically insuperable in the absence of more than the
usual relative disproportion of age and strength between man and woman." Id. at 200, 106
N.W. at 538.
25. See People v. Evans, 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 1089, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (1975) (issue
described by the court as whether the defendant's "predatory conquest" of the complainant
was rape or seduction). Unfortunately, at times these writings did little more than document
misconceptions:
[A] male is supposed to be physically forceful in his sexual behavior. . . . In
many mammals coitus is ordinarily preceded by a physical struggle. . . .The
physiological by-products of excitement and exertion - the increased heart rate,
increased breathing, muscle tension, the greater supply of blood to the body sur-
faces, etc. - all of these are also a part of sexual response and it is easy to see
how these physiological conditions could facilitate a subsequent sexual response.
P. GEBBARD, J. GANON, W. POMEROY & C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
TYPES 177-78 (1965).
26. See, e.g., People v. Nogworth, 152 Cal. App. 2d, 313 P.2d 113 (4th Dist. 1958);
Prokop v. State, 148 Neb. 582, 28 N.W.2d 200 (1947); Perez v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 34, 94
S.W. 1036 (1906).
27. See, e.g., People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 386, 17 Am. R. 349, 358 (1974) (victim
"must resist until exhausted or overpowered unless overawed by the number of assailants or
the threat of death.") See also supra note 24.
on the woman. First, she must have resisted the defendant to the
limits of her physical strength, and second, she must have resisted
during the duration of the attack. 8 Each requirement alone repre-
sented a burden of proof almost impossible for the prosecution to
meet. Together, they established a standard so harsh that in one case
in which the jury was satisfied that the woman had displayed suffi-
cient resistance, the appellate court overturned the verdict by con-
cluding that the victim's conduct fell short of "utmost resistance."2 9
In addition to creating proof problems, the utmost resistance
standard required that a woman risk serious injury to establish her
lack of consent. Thus, rape victims were confronted with the Hob-
son's choice of risking death or serious harm by resisting, or chanc-
ing unsuccessful prosecution as a consequence of having submitted to
their attackers.
The problem inherent in the utmost resistance requirement en-
couraged many jurisdictions to develop different standards to deter-
mine consent. These variations included "earnest resistance, '3 0 "re-
sistance . . . overcome by force or fear, 3 1 resistance reasonable
under the circumstances,32 and resistance proportional to the force
exerted by the defendant. 33 Each of these variations circumvented
the weaknesses of the utmost resistance standard, yet each continued
to focus the courts' attention on the victim's resistance rather than
on the force exerted by the defendant. A conviction for rape, then,
was ironically based more heavily on evidence of the victim's resis-
tance than on a showing of the defendant's act of forcible
intercourse.
The preoccupation of the justice system with equating the ab-
28. Comment, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61
VA. L. REV. 1500 (1975).
29. Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 (1906). The victim alleged that she
had been raped by her neighbor's son. In reversing the jury's conviction the court noted that
the victim was well acquainted with the defendant and that her clothing was neither torn nor
in disarray. See supra note 24.
30. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 1961) (repealed 1982). New York now has
eliminated any requirement that the victim resist.
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(l)(a) (1981).
32. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 108 Cal. App.2d 84, 238 P.2d 158 (2d Dist. 1951)
(holding that when the woman ceases resisting for fear of serious injury or death, trial court
must determine if her fears were reasonable). Accord Shepard v. State, 224 Ind. 356, 67
N.E.2d 534 (1946).
33. In the tentative draft to the 1962 Model Penal Code, the drafters designed their
definition of rape to shift the focus from the victim's conduct to the defendant's. The victim
was still required to demonstrate some resistance to the force used by the defendant during the
assault. However, the amount of resistance exhibited by the victim needed to establish her lack
of consent depended on the force used by the defendant. The victim's conduct, then, was ex-
amined only as a response to the defendant's. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment at
247 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Courts which required that the victim's resistance be propor-
tional to the force used by the defendant nevertheless emphasized the victim's conduct. See
People v. Carey, 223 N.Y. 519, 119 N.E. 83 (1918).
sence of resistance with consent generated a host of criticism."' Leg-
islatures, such as Michigan's, swayed by the severity of these criti-
cisms, enacted rape statutes which drastically departed from the
common law approach to rape. 5 Most notably, far-reaching reform
provisions stated that the victim need not resist.36
Abandonment of the resistance requirement has received both
positive37 and negative 8 reactions. Reverberations continue to be felt
as the provision eliminates the victim's former burden of proving
lack of consent, in turn rendering evidence of the victim's past sexual
activities irrelevant.
To counteract the fear that defendants who actually believed
that the victim was consenting would be convicted for rape, courts
have permitted, with greater frequency, jury instructions on mistakes
of fact.39 Spurred by this new development, defense attorneys have,
with increasing success, used the mistake of fact defense to negate
the consent element of the crime.'0
Increased use of the defense41 has done little to clarify its proper
application to rape trials. Whether the mistake must be reasonable
varies among jurisdictions, often despite similarity of statutes defin-
ing the offense.' Confusion increases in states such as Hawaii,
34. See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1977).
35. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 750.520a-1 (1974) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.788(l)-
(12) (1982)). The Michigan statute employs gender neutral terms, defines sexual penetration
to include the intrusion of "any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's
body," and authorizes a maximum 15 year sentence of for the offense of "sexual contact," the
touching of the victim's or actor's genitals or surrounding clothing for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification. Id.
36. MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.520i (1974) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(9) (1982)).
37. Some commentators note with favor that the statute directs the court's focus away
from the victim's prior sexual activity and towards the amount of violence used by the defen-
dant. See, e.g., Cobb & Schauer, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law in FORCIBLE RAPE
169 (1977).
38. The Model Penal Code criticizes the Michigan statute for implying that resistance
need never be a factor in forcible rape. According to the drafters of the Code, this overbroad
response to the problem of determining consent could result in rape convictions whenever forci-
ble intercourse occurred, even with the woman's consent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 com-
ment 4(a) (1980).
39. See infra note 64.
40. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 649 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (trial court's failure
to instruct jury on defendant's mistaken belief that victim consented to intercourse was preju-
dicial error); State v. Foster, 631 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (defendant drove victim to
secluded woods and threatened her with attack dogs; trial court's failure to instruct on mistake
of fact as to consent was prejudicial error); But see, e.g, People v. Witte, 115 I11. App. 3d 20,
449 N.E.2d 966 (1983) (defendant's unreasonable belief in victim's consent is not a defense to
rape). See generally G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 691-713 (1978).
41. Mistake of fact, although termed a defense, is not an affirmative defense in the true
sense. Rather, the burden remains on the prosecution to establish the requisite mental culpa-
bility. As a practical matter, however, the defense counsel attempts to persuade the judge and
jury that the defendant lacked the state of mind necessary to commit the crime. G. Dix & M.
SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW 298 (2d ed. 1979).
42. See infra notes 55-88 and accompanying text.
which define rape as the intent to have forcible intercourse,43 an
amendment which changes the crime from one requiring general
mens rea to one of specific mens rea."
The classification of rape as either a specific or general intent
crime is critical to the handling of the mistake of fact defense. An
honest mistake, no matter how unreasonable, excuses a defendant
who would otherwise be guilty of a crime requiring specific intent,45
while general intent crimes require both honesty and reasonableness
as to mistake.
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III. Variations of the Mistake of Fact Defense
A. Difficulty in Defining a Mens Rea Standard
As the focal point of rape laws has moved from the victim's to
the defendant's conduct, legislative and judicial determination of the
mental element required to commit rape has proved to be as difficult
as it is essential. The question of mental culpability often did not
arise under older rape statutes; rather, the intent to commit rape was
inferred from the defendant's use of physical force to accomplish in-
tercourse. 7 Under more recently enacted rape statutes, however, de-
termining the level of mental culpability required to commit the of-
fense becomes more difficult.48
Rape statutes drawn from the common law contain no express
language delineating the degree of culpability required to commit
the offense. 9 The defendant need only to have formed the "general"
intent to have intercourse with a woman by force and against her
will. Therefore, a defendant who has formed the intent to engage in
the prohibited act of rape possesses the mental culpability necessary
43. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-730(l)(a) (1975).
44. Literally translated, "mens rea" is "guilty mind." As one of the most elusive terms
in criminal law, mens rea has been defined in innumerable ways. The concept at its most basic
refers to "the awareness of the existence of all those facts which make a person's conduct
criminal." U.S. v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941).
45. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
46. Id.
47. In the early case of Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71, 156 S.W.2d 385 (1941), the
court inferred the defendant's intent to commit rape from his physical act of forcible inter-
course. The court stated that "[i]n the crime of rape no intent is requisite other than that
evidenced by the doing of the acts constituting the offense." id. at 77, 156 S.W.2d at 387
(1941).
48. Unlike the older statutes, in which resistance implied force which indicated intent,
the newer statutes that have minimized or abolished the resistance requirement preclude
courts from making direct inferences. See Comment, Recent Statutory Developments in the
Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV. 1500, 1533 (1975).
49. Wisconsin's old common law statute provided:
Any person who shall ravish and carnally know any female of the age of four-
teen years or more, by force and against her will, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the state prison not more than thirty years nor less than 10 years. ..
Law of May 2, 1895, ch. 370, § 2 [1895] Wis. Laws 753.
for conviction. 50 The general intent required under common law rape
may, however, be negated by the defendant proving that his mental
faculties were impaired or that he made a reasonable mistake about
whether the victim consented.51
The apparent simplicity of the general intent requirement under
common law rape statutes is deceiving. 5 Courts at times confuse
common law rape with assault with intent to rape,53 a separate of-
fense which requires the specific intent to commit rape rather than
the general intent to have forcible intercourse against a women's
will. The distinction is tenuous, but critical. In general intent crimes
a mistake of fact must be both honest and reasonable to excuse the
commission of the offense, while in specific intent crimes, the mis-
take need only be honest.54 An unreasonable mistake, then, excuses
the defendant who commits a crime of specific intent but not the
defendant who commits a crime of general intent. Frequently, case
law deviates from this precept.
B. Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as a Defense
1. Case Law in Support of the Unreasonable Mistake De-
fense. - The most thorough recent treatment of the mistake of fact
defense is the Alaska Court of Appeals' decision in Reynolds v.
State,55 in which the court held that the state must prove that the
50. See State v. Bender, 24 Conn. Supp. 214, 189 A.2d 408 (1962). Cf. State v. Dan-
iels, 109 So.2d 896, 899 (La. 1958) ("general intent exists when from the circumstances the
prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irre-
spective of any subjective desire to have accomplished the result").
51. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 831 (3d ed. 1982).
52. The Model Penal Code has abandoned the terms "general" and "specific" intent,
calling the phrases "an abiding source of ambiguity and confusion in the penal law." Model
Penal Code § 2.02 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See generally W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW (1972); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 142 (2d ed.
1960).
53. See State v. Short, 4 C.M.A. 437, 16 C.M.R. 11 (1954). The defendant, a service-
man stationed abroad, mistook a Japanese woman for a prostitute. Further, he mistook her
protestations as price negotiations. At trial, the defendant was convicted for assault with intent
to rape. In affirming the conviction, the appeals court discussed the crime in terms of general
intent.
Justice Brosman, in a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, reasoned
that assault with the intent to commit rape is, by its very definition, a specific intent crime and
that an unreasonable mistake of fact - like the one asserted by the defendant - should
exculpate him. Rape, on the other hand, is ordinarily treated as a general intent crime for
which a mistake must be reasonable to negate intent. Brosman admitted that the reasoning
seemed anamolous, but concluded that it was no more so than that "involved in holding that
an assault with intent to murder requires a specific intent to kill, whereas the crime of murder
may be made out with a lesser intent." Id. at 439, C.M.R. at 13.
54. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
55. 664 P.2d 621 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). The defendant, Reynolds, was convicted of
sexual assault in the first degree despite his contention that the complainant had consented. On
appeal, Reynolds attacked the constitutionality of Alaska's sexual assault statute, alleging that
the statute, which contained no mens rea language, was unconstitutionally vague and set a
standard of strict liability regarding consent.
defendant acted at least recklessly regarding the complainant's lack
of consent.56 By establishing a requirement of recklessness, the court
acknowledged that unreasonable conduct in failing to ensure that the
woman consented constitutes a valid defense.
Previously, Alaska had based its definition of rape on the corn-
mon law. 57 Because the offense was treated like a general intent
crime, the state bore the burden of proving that the defendant in-
tended forcible intercourse against the woman's will. The prosecu-
tion was not required to prove that the defendant either knew or
should have known that the woman did not consent. In applying this
common law rule, courts required that the victim resist to the
utmost.58
In Alaska, the utmost resistance standard was plagued with the
same problems as had been encountered in other jurisdictions. 9
Eventually, the legislature abolished any provisions that the victim
resist at all.6" The court noted this development by stating, "[Tihe
legislature has substantially enhanced the risk of conviction in am-
biguous circumstances by eliminating the requirement that the state
prove resistance."'"
To counteract this risk, the court interpreted tht revised statute
to require a culpable mental state for every element of the crime,
including lack of consent. 2 As the statute itself failed to specify the
mental state required of the defendant in determining lack of con-
sent,' the court looked to legislative intent and required that the
defendant be reckless in ascertaining consent to be guilty of rape."
56. Id. at 625. The Alaskan statute provides in pertinent part: "A person commits the
crime of sexual assault in the first degree if, being any age, the defendant engages in sexual
penetration with another person without consent of that person." ALASKA STAT. §
11.41.410(a)(1) (1983).
57. See Walker v. State, 652 P.2d 88 (1982) (rape defined as a general intent crime
requiring only proof of voluntary commission of the prohibited act to support conviction).
58. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
59. See State v. Risen, 192 Or. 557, 235 P.2d 764 (1951) (construing a statute similar
to ALASKA STAT. 11.150.120). The court interpreted utmost resistance as resistance "reasona-
bly proportionate to [the woman's] strength and her opportunities. It must not be a mere
pretended resistance but in good faith and continued to the extent of the woman'a ability until
the act has been consummated." Id. at 558, 235 P.2d at 765. See also supra note 33.
60. ALASKA STAT. 11.41.470(3)(A) (1983) (providing that "without consent means
that a person with or without resisting is coerced by the use of force .. ").
61. 664 P.2d 621, 624 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). The court noted that the legislature
had also broadened the definitions of "force" and "physical injury" to include, respectively,
"force against a person or property" and "express or implied threat of death". Id.
62. The Alaskan statute comports with the Model Penal Code in this regard. The Code
requires that "when the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is
not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or
recklessly with respect thereto." See S. TOLL, PA. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 302(c) at 64 (1974).
63. To commit sexual assault in the first degree under the Alaskan statute, a person
must either "engage in sexual penetration with another person without consent of that person"
or "'attempt to engage in sexual penetration with another person without consent of that person
and cause serious physical harm to that person." ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (1983).
64. The committee responsible for drafting the statute suggested:
Despite the court's painstaking interpretation of Alaskan law,
the Reynolds decision is flawed in two respects. First, after recogniz-
ing that the legislature substantially reduced the prosecution's bur-
den of proving the act of rape by eliminating the requirement that
the victim resist, the court frustrated the purpose of the legislation
by allowing the defendant to argue that because the victim did not
resist, he believed - albeit unreasonably - that she consented.
Once the defendant raises this unreasonable mistake of fact de-
fense the burden of disproving the claim properly falls on the prose-
cution.65 The state's most effective attack is to offer evidence that the
victim actively resisted. A jury would be unlikely to believe a defen-
dant who argues that he honestly but mistakenly believed the victim
consented when confronted with a battered woman. In permitting
both reasonable and unreasonable mistakes of fact to constitute de-
fenses, then, the Reynolds court renders prosecutions involving a vic-
tim who does not actively resist just as likely to fail as similar cases
which arose when Alaska law required resistance.
The second flaw in Reynolds is that although the court recog-
nized that Alaska's definition of rape is based on the common law
and is therefore a crime of general intent, 66 the court ignored the
basic doctrine of such common law statutes: if the defendant can
show that he mistakenly believed that the victim consented to inter-
course, he lacks culpable intent - provided that the mistake is both
honest and reasonable.
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2. The Unreasonable Mistake Defense in Pennsylvania.
Unreasonable mistakes appear to be a defense to rape in Pennsylva-
nia, although a recent holding by a three-judge panel of the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court' has clouded the issue. In Commonwealth v.
Williams,"9 the Superior Court upheld the trial court's denial of a
[Wihen a statute in the Code provides that a person must recklessly cause a
result or disregard a circumstance, criminal liability will result if the defendant
"is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the result will occur or that the circumstance exists." The test for recklessness is
a subjective one - the defendant must actually be aware of the risk. On the
other hand, if criminal negligence is the applicable culpable mental state, the
defendant will be criminally liable if he "fails to perceive a substantial and un-
justifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists." The
test for criminal negligence is an objective one - the defendant's culpability
stems from his failure to perceive the risk.
ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1976, at 2 (1978), quoted
in Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
65. See supra note 41.
66. 664 P.2d 621, 623 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
67. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
68. Commonwealth v. Williams, 294 Pa. Super. 93, 439 A.2d 765 (1982).
69. 294 Pa. Super. 93, 439 A.2d 765 (1982). The defendant offered the victim a ride
and then drove her to a dark, secluded area and demanded intercourse. After the defendant
twice threatened to kill her, the victim told him to "get on with it." Id. at 95, 439 A.2d at 767.
jury instruction on mistake of fact. The instruction proffered by the
defense stated that a reasonably held belief that the victim consented
to intercourse would exculpate the defendant." In refusing to give
this instruction to the jury, the court contended that the use of force
to accomplish intercourse without a person's consent is the only cri-
teria of concern to Pennsylvania courts in rape cases. The court cited
the Pennsylvania rape statute, which defines rape as intercourse by
forcible compulsion that prevents resistance by a reasonable person,
in support of this conclusion. Under the Williams holding, then, any
belief held by defendant, either reasonably or unreasonably, that his
victim consented is immaterial. The court stated that it refused to
create a defense of "the defendant's belief as to the victim's state of
mind."'" Rather, such a defense must be established by the
legislature.
The Williams case raises the question whether a mistake of fact
defense concerning victim consent exists in any form in Pennsylva-
nia. The decision has its critics. The subcommittee charged with
drafting Pennsylvania's Suggested Standard Jury Instructions ques-
tions whether Williams is consistent with the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code, specifically the sections which define levels of culpability 2 and
describe the defense of ignorance or mistake.7 The former section
provides that when the mental intent necessary to commit an offense
is not stated, the defendant must act at least recklessly. 4 The latter
section states, in part, that a mistake of fact affords a defense if it
negates the mens rea required for the crime, provided that there is
At trial, a jury convicted the defendant of rape. The conviction was affirmed on appeal over
the defendant's contention that the trial judge erred in denying an instruction on mistake of
fact.
70. Id. at 98, 439 A.2d at 769. The instruction was based on the charge given to the
jury in Gordon v. State, 32 Ala. App. 388, 26 So. 2d 419 (1946). In Gordon, the court in-
structed that:
If the jury believes, from the evidence, that the conduct of the prosecutrix was
such toward the defendant, at the time of the alleged rape, as to create in the
mind of the defendant the honest and reasonable belief that she had consented,
or was willing for the defendant to have connection with her, they must acquit
the defendant.
32 Ala. App. 388 at 390, 26 So. 2d at 420. In Williams, the defendant inexplicably omitted
form his instruction the qualification that his mistaken belief need be honest as well as
reasonable.
71. 294 Pa. Super. 93, 98, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (1982). Implicit in the Williams court's
reluctance to instruct the jury on mistake is its dismissal of Gordon as an "obscure Alabama
case." id. The cases are distinguishable in that the victim was intoxicated in Gordon and
argued that in being "mentally unconscious from drink," she could not give effective consent.
Id. Thus, the defendant in Gordon mistakenly believed that the victim was sober enough to be
responsible for her acts. As the element of intoxication is absent for Williams, the victim's
state of mind is not at issue. Rather, the defense concerns the defendant's mistaken belief as to
the victim's outward behavior.
72. S. TOLL, PA. CRIMES CODE ANN. § 302 (1974).
73. Id. § 304.
74. 18 PA. CoNST. STAT. ANN. § 302 (Purdon 1973).
"a reasonable explanation or excuse for the defense." 7
Since Pennsylvania's rape statute, like most statutes derived
from the common law, contains no express mens rea requirement,7"
the mental element required to commit rape in necessarily reckless-
ness. Under the Crimes Code, then, any mistake of fact for which
there is a reasonable justification and which negates the recklessness
required to commit rape exculpates the defendant. The Subcommit-
tee, therefore, properly questions the Williams court's refusal to in-
struct the jury on the reasonable mistake of fact defense.
The Subcommittee advocates that Pennsylvania courts should
recognize as a defense any non-recklessly held belief concerning con-
sent. 77 The defendant who unreasonably believes that a woman con-
sents to intercourse does not behave as a reasonable man would, yet
his conduct is not necessarily reckless. According to the Subcommit-
tee, Pennsylvania courts should recognize defendants' unreasonably
held mistakes that their victims consent as a defense to forcible rape.
The Subcommittee's analysis is preferrable to that of the Wil-
liams court because it recognizes that a defendant's belief that his
victim has consented precludes his conduct in compelling intercourse
from being forceful. As forcible compulsion is an element of the
crime of rape, the defendant's belief that his victim consented is ma-
terial to establishing his guilt or innocence, contrary to the court's
statement in Williams. The Subcommittee's position, however, gives
little weight to the qualification in the Crimes Code that a mistake
need be reasonable to afford a defense. The Joint State Government
Commission's commentary to the Ignorance or Mistake provision of
the Code states:
[A] bona fide and reasonable belief in the existence of facts,
which would render an act innocent if they did exist, is a good
defense. Where mistake of fact is not based upon reasonable
grounds, it is not a defense even though the belief in its exis-
tence is bona fide. ... 78
Should this commentary be applied, a mistake of fact which is hon-
75. S. TOLL, PA. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 304 (1974).
76. The statute provides:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not his spouse: (1) by forcible compulsion; (2)
by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of
reasonable resolution; (3) who is unconscious; or (4) who is so mentally de-
ranged or deficient that such person is incapable of consent.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Purdon 1973).
77. The recommendation states that "the court should recognize as a defense a defen-
dant's non-recklessly held, mistaken belief regarding consent." PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Crim) § 15.3121A (Reporter's Draft 1983).
78. S. TOLL, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE ANNOTATED § 304 Pennsylvania Joint
State Government Commission note (1974).
est but not reasonable fails as a defense. The unreasonable belief
may, however, reduce the gravity of the offense.7" Thus, the unrea-
sonable mistake under Pennsylvania law should be a mitigating fac-
tor which reduces the crime from rape to a lesser offense. A non-
reckless, unreasonably held belief should afford no defense.
3. Case Law Rejecting the Unreasonable Mistake Defense. -
The Supreme Court of California was one of the first courts to re-
spond to the risks created by the substantial dilution of the resis-
tance requirement which has occurred in most jurisdictions.8" To
counteract the increasing possibility that an innocent defendant
might be convicted when the victim's lack of consent was ambiguous,
the court held in People v. Mayberry8 that the defendant is entitled
to an instruction on honest and reasonable mistake of fact.82 The
court did not address whether an unreasonable mistake would consti-
tute a defense to rape, but rather, it implicitly rejected the unreason-
able mistake defense by concluding that the defendant must "reason-
ably and genuinely" believe that the victim consented.83
Unlike the Alaskan statute construed in Reynolds, which pro-
vided that resistance was not required of the complainant, 4 the Cali-
fornia statute applied in Mayberry required that a woman resist and
that her resistance be overcome by force.85 The presence of a resis-
79. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
80. California traditionally has been a leader in rape reform legislation. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667.6 (West 1970) (full, separate, and consecutive sentences imposed for mul-
tiple sex crimes); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.8 (life sentence for habitual sex offenders). See
also, People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 670, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964) (first case
to allow a reasonable but mistaken belief that a girl was above the statutory age as a defense
to statutory rape). See generally Note, California Enacts Legislation to Aid Victims of Crimi-
nal Violence, 18 STAN. L. REV. 266 (1965).
81. 15 Cal. App. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975). The defendant
followed the victim into a grocery store and demanded that she accompany him outside. She
left with him, then persuaded him to allow her to return to the store to buy cigarettes. When
the victim completed her purchase, the defendant seized her by the elbow and led her to his
apartment where he sexually assaulted her. Although the defendant had verbally threatened
the victim she failed to request help or attempt escape.
82. The instruction provides:
It is a defense to a charge of forcible rape that the defendant entertained a
reasonable and good faith belief that the female person voluntarily consented to
engage in sexual intercourse. If from all the evidence you have a reasonable
doubt whether the defendant reasonably and in good faith believed she volunta-
rily consented to engage in sexual intercourse, you must give the defendant the
benefit of that doubt and acquit him of said charge.
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL INSTRUCTION No. 10.23 (1979). The court ac-
knowledged that the complainant's behavior was equivocal and that the defendant could have
construed that she consented. Sufficient evidence also permitted the jury to infer that the pros-
ecutrix was unable to think clearly or react because of fear. The majority, therefore, held that
the trial court erred in refusing the instruction.
83. 15 Cal. 3d 143, 158, 542 P.2d 1337, 1344, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 754 (1975).
84. See supra note 60.
85. "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not the wife of
the perpetrator . . . [wlhere she resists, but her resistance is overcome by force or violence."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(3) (West 1970) (amended 1980).
tance requirement explains why the Mayberry court was less hesi-
tant than the Reynolds court to recognize honest and reasonable
mistakes of fact as a defense: the threat of false conviction was sub-
stantially lesser under the old California statute where the victim
was required to resist than under the statute applied in Reynolds.8 6
In State v. Dizon,87 the Supreme Court of Hawaii, like the Cali-
fornia and Alaska courts acknowledged the erosion of the strict stan-
dard of "utmost resistance," but unlike them specifically rejected an
instruction on mistake of fact which did not clearly detail that the
mistake must be reasonable.88 The court dismissed the instruction as
"confusing and misleading" and "not . .. a full statement of the
law."89 To support its decision, the majority stated the common law
principle that a mistake of fact which acts as a defense to a crime of
general intent may not be formed as a result of the defendant's neg-
ligence or carelessness.9 "
Neither the Mayberry nor the Dizon court offered strong justifi-
cation for their holdings other than by indicating that rape is a crime
of general intent. The opinions, therefore, present scant precedent
for courts seeking to establish that a defendant's mistaken belief that
his victim consented must be reasonable.
C. England's Approach to Mistake of Fact: Rape as a Crime of
Specific Intent
In England, courts grappled with the same questions concerning
the appropriate standards for stating a consent defense and produced
elegant discussions of mens rea. The conclusions reached by the En-
glish courts, however, differ radically from those of the American
courts.
The facts in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan" typify
the bizarre circumstances under which the mistake of fact defense
arises in rape cases. The defendant, Morgan, was drinking with the
three other defendants. All were members of the R.A.F. Morgan,
who was considerably older and senior in rank, invited his compan-
ions to have intercourse with his wife. Though surprised, they ac-
86. In 1980, the California Legislature amended § 261 to read that rape is an act of
sexual intercourse "where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force or fear
of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another." CAL. PENAL CODE §
261(2) (West Supp. 1984).
87. 47 Hawaii 444, 390 P.2d 759 (1964).
88. The instruction read in pertinent part: "if you believe from the evidence that the
defendant in fact believed that consent to the act had been given ...you must find him not
guilty of the crime of rape." Id. at 459, 390 P.2d at 769.
89. Id.
90. See I F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 157 at 382 (1957).
91. [19751 2 W.L.R. 913.
cepted his explanation that Mrs. Morgan was "kinky" '92 and enjoyed
forcible intercourse. At trial, the defendants testified that Mrs. Mor-
gan had willingly consented. Mrs. Morgan testified that she had
been brutally raped and humiliated. The trial judge instructed the
jury that a person would not be guilty of rape if he honestly and
reasonably believed the complainant consented. 93 The jury convicted
all four defendants, three of whom appealed.
The Court of Appeals94 dismissed the appeal and held that the
instruction was proper. The court also certified the question of mis-
take to the House of Lords: "Whether in rape the defendant can
properly be convicted notwithstanding that he in fact believed that
the woman consented, if such a belief was not based on reasonable
grounds."95 The House of Lords held, by a three to two majority,
that an honestly held belief that a woman consented to intercourse
exculpates a defendant charged with rape. The Lords further held
that the trial judge had misdirected the jury by stating that the mis-
taken belief must be reasonable as well as honest.
The majority acknowledged that crimes of general intent neces-
sitate that a mistake pled as a defense be both honest and reasona-
ble.96 But rape, they reasoned, requires the specific intent to have
intercourse without the victim's consent. A defense of honest and
reasonable mistake was intended to buttress the poorly drafted mens
rea requirement of general intent crimes. The court cited the nine-
teenth-century bigamy case of Regina v. Tolson,97 which held that a
mistaken belief based on reasonable grounds affords a defense. The
majority argued that the same defense used to excuse a statutory
offense like bigamy could not be applied to a common law crime like
rape where the treatment of mens rea is entirely different.98
92. Id. at 929.
93. The instruction stated:
[l~f the defendant believed or may have believed that Mrs. Morgan consented to
him having sexual intercourse with her, then there would be no such intent in his
mind and he would be not guilty of the offense of rape, but such a belief must be
honestly held by the defendant in the first place. . . . And, secondly, his belief
must be as a reasonable man would entertain if he applied his mind and thought
about the matter. It is not enough for a defendant to rely upon a belief, even
though he honestly held it, if it was completely fanciful; contrary to every indi-
cation which could be given which would carry some weight with a reasonable
man.
id.
94. Regina v. Morgan [19751 I All E.R. 8.
95. Id. at 922 (emphasis deleted).
96. [19751 2 W.L.R. at 941.
97. 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889).
98. Lord Fraser described the statutory crime of bigamy dealt within Tolson as an
"absolute offense," requiring no intention except that of "going through a marriage cere-
mony." 2 W.L.R. at 945. Since no mental element is required, a defendant's mistaken belief
that his spouse is dead cannot negate a material element of the crime. Rape, however, "always
has been defined as intercourse without consent of the victim," thus requiring "the intention to
commit the act." Id. at 937 (Hailsham, L).
Lord Simon, dissenting, agreed with the lower court that a be-
lief for which the defendant can give no reasonable basis is "evi-
dence of insufficient substance to raise any issue requiring the jury's
consideration." 9 More importantly, though, Lord Simon advanced
the position advocated by rape legislation reformers in the United
States: a more even balance must be struck between the victim and
the accused. This could be accomplished, Lord Simon reasoned, by
requiring that a defendant base his honestly held mistaken belief on
reasonable grounds.
IV. The Aftermath of Morgan
A. The Reaction Abroad
The Morgan decision created a furor in England and Austra-
lia. 00 In response to public demand, a committee was organized to
study the decision and to make recommendations on the proper
course of action. 10' The report released by the committee affirmed
the soundness of the Morgan holding and made two recommenda-
tions. First, the court's conclusion that recklessness regarding con-
sent is the mental element required to support a rape conviction
must be codified to prevent its dismissal as dicta. Second, a means
by which the jury in a rape case determines whether the defendant
honestly believed that the woman consented must be developed.102
The committee urged that juries consider the reasonableness of the
Although the Lords' definition of bigamy as a general intent crime seems at least plausi-
ble, their interpretation of rape as a specific intent crime further complicates the definition of
mens rea. The statute applicable in Morgan simply states that it is a crime "for a man to rape
a woman." Sexual Offenses Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. I, ch. 69, § 1(1). The statute states the
common law definition of rape, similar to that applied in colonial America. See supra note 23.
The majority of the Lords interpreted the common law of rape as requiring specific intent,
however, the common law of rape in America is treated as a crime requiring general intent.
Therefore, the arguments forwarded by Lord Hailsham defining the specific intent required for
rape are similar to those used in the United States to define the general intent needed for the
offense. See generally Howard, The Reasonableness of Mistake in the Criminal Law, 4 U.
TORONTO L.J. 45 (1961).
99. [1975] 2 W.L.R. at 943. The second dissenting opinion given by Lord Edmund-
Davies, argued that a belief need only be honestly held, but the jury should consider the rea-
sonableness of the belief in determining its honesty. Id. at 949. This approach balances the
views proffered by the majority and Lord Simon. See 8 SYDNEY L. REv. 196, 200 (1977).
100. The public's intense reaction to Morgan can be attributed in part to an earlier
decision by the court in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, [1961] A.C. 290.
In Smith, the court upheld a murder conviction based on jury instructions which charged
that murder is committed willfully when a "reasonable man [would] have contemplated that
grievous bodily harm was likely to result .. " Smith resulted in English jurists approaching
the reasonable man standard with undue caution. One commentator states, "[Tihe decision in
[Morgan] was probably more a reaction to past infelicitous decisions, than the result either of
natural reason or of the artificial reason of lawyers." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 704 (1978).
101. See Note, The Intent Necessary to Rape, 8 SYDNEY L. REV. 196, 202 (1977).
102. Id.
defendant in holding the honest belief, implying that if the defendant
was unreasonable in his belief, a jury would conclude that he was
lying. 10
The Morgan holding was extended in England in the case of
Regina v. Cogan."4 The co-defendant, Leak, invited Cogan to have
intercourse with his wife, whom he had earlier beaten and
threatened. Mrs. Leak displayed obvious distress during the inter-
course. At trial, a jury convicted Cogan after finding that he had no
reasonable grounds on which to base a belief that Mrs. Leak con-
sented. 0 5 On appeal, Cogan's conviction was overturned when the
court, applying Morgan, found that he had honestly believed that
the complainant consented because of the representations made to
him by Leak.' 6 The subjective standard of an honest belief, however
unreasonable, thus is well entrenched in English law.
Australian courts have reached similar conclusions. The Crimi-
nal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia
supported the Morgan holding in its special report, stating that be-
cause rape is such a serious crime, liability should be imposed only
for recklessly held beliefs."'7
Following the lead of England, the Australian committee as-
serted that the jury would disbelieve a defendant who alleged an
honest mistake regarding consent in cases where force was apparent.
The committee further undermined arguments that mistakes of fact
must be reasonably by noting that supporters of the reasonable mis-
take requirement tend to view rape as a crime between the victim
and the defendant, rather than between the crown and the accused,
the implication being that too much emphasis is placed on the victim
in a rape case.'0 8
103. The committee's concern with the "reasonably honest defendant" undercuts the
Morgan court's insistence on creating a subjective standard for mistakes. However, one com-
mentator states that "it may be true, as a matter of practice, that only mistakes rendered
believable by the circumstances of the case will in fact generate an acquittal." G. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 708 (1978).
104. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 316.
105. Id. at 317.
106. Cogan mistook the victim's sobs to mean consent as a result of Leak's statements
and his own extreme intoxication. The Court of Appeals, in discussing the mistake of fact
defense, failed to clarify whether Cogan's mistake was presumably a result of the misrepresen-
tations or the intoxication. If it were the latter, the decision would extend Morgan to allow
voluntary intoxication which negates intent as a defense to rape. This result conflicts with both
the common law and Model Penal Code, where voluntary intoxication is no defense to rape.
See Comment, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1500, 1541 (1975).
107. See Note, The Intent Necessary to Rape, 8 SYDNEY L. REV. 196, 204 (1977).
108. Id. Quaere whether this statement takes into account the purposes of rape laws: to
convict guilty defendants and to protect the privacy and physical integrity of women. Lord
Simon reasons:
A respectable woman who has been ravished would hardly feel that she was
vindicated by being told that her assailant must go unpunished because he be-
lieved, quite unreasonably, that she was consenting to sexual intercourse with
Prior to the committee's report and the Morgan decision, Aus-
tralian courts followed Regina v. Brown.1 9 In Brown, the Supreme
Court of South Australia held that an honest belief that the woman
consented is inconsistent with the mens rea necessary for rape.
Under this holding, the reasonableness of the mistaken belief is
irrelevant.
In England and Australia, then, the emphasis when the mistake
of fact defense is raised historically has been on the honesty of the
defendant's belief. The importance of ascertaining a defendant's sub-
jective state of mind explains the courts' emphasis on the honesty of
mistakes, for to determine honesty, courts must necessarily focus on
the individual and his perceptions. As a practical matter, the subjec-
tive and objective inquiries are merged,"' if the mistake is unreason-
able, jurors will not find that the defendant honestly made the
mistake.
That juries necessarily use an objective, reasonable person stan-
dard in determining whether the defendant honestly held this belief
seriously undermines the arguments made by courts recognizing the
unreasonable mistake of fact defense to rape. These courts reason
that given the criminal law's emphasis on ascertaining a person's
subjective state of mind before assessing punishment, the subjective
standard of recklessness is an essential limitation to a mistaken be-
lief regarding consent. The objective standard of reasonableness,
however, which would preclude unreasonable mistakes from afford-
ing a defendant a complete defense to rape would be more consistent
with the implicit reasoning of juries.
B. Weaknesses in the Morgan Decision
The main thrust of the criticism of Morgan is that an accused
may now claim that he believed the prosecutrix consented when the
weight of evidence indicates that intercourse was accomplished with-
out her consent."' That the jury may conclude that a belief so un-
reasonably held could not be honest affords little consolation, for it
leaves to the jury the task of correcting by common sense a defect in
the law itself.
The jury in Morgan aptly demonstrated this concern; it rejected
the defendants' testimony and found that they could not have hon-
him.
[1975] 2 W.L.R. 913 at 943.
109. (1975) 10 S. Austl. St. R. 139.
110. Invariably when analyzing the behavior of an individual, jurors will consider the
behavior of the reasonable man in their deliberations. See supra note 103.
I ll. See Comment, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Stan-
dard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 146 (1983).
estly believed that Mrs. Morgan consented. 12 Therefore, the argu-
ment used to defend Morgan - that morally blameless defendants
will not be convicted - breaks down once the issue of honest belief
goes to the jury.
C. Strengths of the Morgan Decision
The criticisms directed at the requirement that mistakes be rea-
sonable are based on the principle that deterrence cannot justify
punishing people who are innocent. 1 3 To convict a defendant when
he honestly but unreasonably believed his victim consented would be
to impose a penalty after deciding that the defendant intended no
harm. Thus, unreasonable mistakes would be treated like strict lia-
bility crimes - a highly criticized area of criminal law.
14
Constitutional limitations also prevent punishing defendants
who lacked mental culpability. The fourteenth amendment mandates
that no person be denied life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess." 5 Incarcerating a defendant for a substantial number of years
without giving credence to the criminal law's concern with subjective
states of mind could violate due process."1 "
On the most basic level, however, the criminal justice system
considers a defendant not guilty of a crime unless he acts at least
recklessly with regard to the facts which make his conduct criminal.
Punishing the criminally negligent individual does little to further
the goals of the criminal justice system."'
V. Toward a Workable Solution
A. The Common Law Standard of Reasonableness
Morgan has had wide reaching effect in the United States. The
case is cited in innumerable articles discussing the problems of mens
112. [1975] 2 W.L.R. 913 at 946.
113. See Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 632 (1963); Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV.
107.
114. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 218-23 (1972).
115. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I.
116. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (ordinance which imposes strict
liability for failure to register as a felon violates due process). See generally Wasserstrom,
Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REv. 731 (1960).
117. Professor Keedy states:
If the defendant, being mistaken as to the material facts, is to be punished be-
cause his mistake is one an average man would not make, punishment will some-
times be inflicted when the criminal mind does not exist. Such a result is con-
trary to fundamental principles, and is plainly unjust, for a man should not be
held criminal because of lack of intelligence.
Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REv. 75, 84 (1908).
rea in rape."' One commentator has stated that the recklessness in-
quiry required under Morgan "seems a far more appropriate stan-
dard of mens rea for rape than the intention now required by Hawaii
and other states."" 9
The results reaching in Morgan, however, are based on the
court's analysis of rape as a crime requiring specific intent. This
analysis of rape is clearly antithetical to the American common law
tradition that defines rape as a crime requiring only general in-
tent. 2 ' Morgan cannot be applied in this country as it is in England,
simply because the basic premises regarding intent are inapposite.
The House of Lords, in Morgan, stated that in crimes which fail
to specify a particular mens rea, courts may imply from the common
law a defense of honest and reasonable mistake which would clarify
the otherwise vague mens rea requirement. This rationale has also
been cited in the American courts that require reasonable
mistakes.' 2 '
The fear, however, of convicting a man who honestly though
unreasonably believed that the woman consented has resulted in
courts rejecting the common law's requirement of reasonableness
and instead applying Morgan, thus allowing an honest mistake alone
to excuse what would otherwise be rape. In these jurisdictions, there
is no need to prove that the defendant is free from fault, for any
mistake made in good faith suffices as a defense. Defendants in such
jurisdictions are not morally blameless for they have not acted as
society expects a reasonable person to act, yet rape laws provide no
means by which to justly punish them.
B. Grading the Offense
1. The Approach of the Homicide Law. - The law of homi-
cide provides an excellent model that can be applied to the crime of
rape. With homicide offenses, culpability is graded into degrees. As
one criminologist notes, "Culpability is not a matter of intending or
not intending, but a question of degree. And the degree of culpabil-
ity is gauged by the actor's interaction with his victim and the rela-
tive dependence or indepedence from the surrounding
environment.
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118. See, e.g., Pickard, Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the Crime,
30 U. TORONTO L.J. 75, 92 n.53 (1980); Comment, Recent Statutory Developments iH the
Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV. 1500, 1537 (1975); Ireland, Reform Rape Legis-
lation: A New Standard of Sexual Responsibility, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 185, 200 n.81 (1978).
119. Comment, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61
VA. L. REV. 1500, 1541 (1975). See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
122. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 711 (1978).
The characteristics of homicide which led to its division into de-
grees according to the culpability and dangerousness of the of-
fender's conduct are similar to those of rape. Homicides are typically
committed by people acquainted with the victim. 123 Similarly, almost
half of all rapes are committed by a person known to the victim.
124
Homicide is a product of human interaction, as is rape. The law rec-
ognizes that the gravity of a murderer's act may be diminished by
surrounding circumstances, just as the reprehensibility of a rapist's
conduct may depend on the circumstances surrounding the offense.
In recognizing a need to distinguish among murderers according
to their different levels of culpability, legislators and judges have cre-
ated distinct degrees of homicide offenses, the penalties of which are
determined according to the degree.
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2. Gradation of Forcible Rape in the Model Penal Code. -
Where is exists, varying the level of the offense with reference to the
degree of culpability involved, typically is done according to the vic-
tim's relationship with the defendant. 2 ' The Model Penal Code di-
vides rape into two degrees. The defendant commits rape in the first
degree if he inflicts serious bodily injury on the victim or if the vic-
tim is not a voluntary social companion of the defendant when the
crime occurs and has not previously engaged in consensual sexual
intercourse with him. Rape is classified as a felony in the second
degree in all other instances, except those defined in the Code's last
category as "gross sexual imposition," an offense which is a felony in
the third degree. The crimes prohibited by this section include non-
123. M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 83 (1958).
124. One study of the victim-offender relationship divides rapists into two primary cate-
gories: strangers, and persons known to the victim, the latter of which is further subdivided
into six groups. Strangers comprise 42.3% of all rapists with the remaining 57.7% falling
within one of the latter categories. M. AMIN, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 246-47 (1971).
125. First degree murder consists of premeditated and deliberate killings, and felony-
murder where the felony is arson, rape, burglary, or robbery. Second degree murder is inten-
tional killing committed without the premeditation and deliberation which characterizes first
degree murder. Second degree murder also includes killings which result from the intention to
inflict serious bodily injury. Homicide is further divided into two categories of manslaughter;
voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter is most typically described as murder com-
mitted while in the heat of passion: intentional killing the seriousness of which is mitigated by
a "reasonably induced emotional disturbance." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 573
(1972). Involuntary manslaughter is killing which results from criminal negligence, a standard
of negligence which requires the presence of an unreasonable risk that death will result from
the defendant's act. See generally, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 562-86 (1972).
As the degree of the crime decreases, so does the severity of the penalty. Fletcher states,
"The grading of homicide disabuses us of the view that voluntariness and freedom of the will
are black-and-white issues. Rather the shading develops by perceptible degrees from total de-
pendence on circumstances to total independence of external influence." G. FLETCHER, RE-
THINKING CRIMINAL LAW 353 (1978).
126. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980). The drafter explain: "[A] community's
sense of insecurity (and consequently the demand for retributive justice) is especially sharp in
relation to the character who lurks on the highway or alley to assault whatever woman passes.
. . . MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment at 243 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
consensual intercourse accomplished by threat, by fraud, or with the
knowledge of a victim's mental incapacity or inability to appraise the
situation. Since physical force is not used in such circumstances the
drafters concluded it would be proper to reduce the degree of the
offense accordingly.1"7
The gradations of forcible rape under the Model Penal Code are
premised on three controlling factors: manifestations of the defen-
dant's culpability and dangerousness, the presence or absence of fac-
tors which objectively verify the culpability and dangerousness of the
defendant, and the amount of harm suffered by the victim. 2 ' These
factors closely parallel those used in grading the homicide offenses,
and afford an effective means of creating distinctions among defen-
dants. The rapist who beats his victim into submission would mani-
fest the necessary culpability and dangerousness to differentiate his
act from that of the defendant who, for instance, unwittingly has
intercourse with a willing woman who is legally incapable of giving
effective consent because of her mental incompetence.
3. Recommendation. - The glaring failure of legislatures to
include an offense of unreasonable mistakes as to consent has en-
couraged arbitrary results. Some jurisdictions convict and sentence
the defendant to a long prison term"29 while in the same circum-
stances others would find him innocent and release him.13 0 To rem-
edy these inconsistencies, unreasonable mistakes should be treated as
an offense punishable by a term of years shorter than that estab-
lished for rape.' 3 ' Giving due consideration to the low level of culpa-
bility required by the suggested offense, as well as to the general
proposition that behavior must be at least reckless to merit strict
criminal sanctions, the unreasonable mistake should be classified as
either rape in the fourth degree or, following the Model Penal Code,
gross sexual imposition in the second degree.
This commentator recognizes that criminalizing unreasonable
mistakes regarding consent raises questions about the efficacy of im-
posing sanctions on conduct that is less than reckless. Such a step is
neither new nor foreign to the law, however, because numerous laws
already exist which punish defendants who possess neither the sub-
127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment, at 279 (1980).
128. Id.
129. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
131. For example, the Michigan statute punishes criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree by "imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years," and criminal
sexual conduct in the fourth degree as a "misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not
more than 2 years, or by a fine of not more that $500.00 or both." MICH COMP. LAWS §§
750.520(b)(2), 750.520(e)(2) (1974) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.788(2)(2), 28.788(5)(2)
(1982)).
jective intent nor the actual knowledge to commit a crime."3 2 By re-
quiring members of society to comply with legally prescribed stan-
dards of behavior, these laws comport with the purposes of the
criminal justice system. Furthermore, the constitutionality of these
laws has been upheld by. the Supreme Court.
The often voiced opinion that it is senseless to hold a person
criminally liable for acts committed negligently 133 has typically
prompted legislators and judges to require recklessness as an essen-
tial limitation on the mens rea needed to commit a crime. However,
as has already been detailed, important considerations for a contrary
position exist. The mens rea required in situations involving provoca-
tion, which distinguishes murder from manslaughter, is by common
law and statute the objective standard of the reasonable man and the
way he would react to provocation. 34
One commentator has observed, "There is nothing unreasonable
in requiring a citizen to take responsible care to ascertain the facts
relevant to his avoiding doing a prohibited act."' 3 5 Rather than com-
pletely exculpating the defendant who unreasonably believed the
prosecutrix consented, legislatures should recognize that the exis-
tence of such a belief merely reduces the gravity of the offense.
Grading the crime of rape to include an offense of unreasonable mis-
take as to consent would eliminate the dilemma juries currently face
of either acquitting a defendant of reprehensible conduct or convict-
ing him of an offense which imposes serious penalties.
The defense of reasonable mistake of fact concerning consent
will comport with the common law and thus provide a complete de-
fense to the more culpable offense of forcible rape. Jury instructions
on the issue of mistake should clearly reflect the qualification of rea-
sonableness and will do much to avert the confusion and misunder-
standing prevalent in rape cases where the mistake of fact defense is
raised.
VI. Conclusion
The biases and misconceptions attendant to rape are as old as
the crime itself. The origin of rape laws as a means of protecting a
man's property interest in his daughter's virginity accounts for the
laws' competing objectives of protecting women from sexual assault
132. E.g., the blue-sky statute construed in State v. Dobry, 217 Iowa 858, 250 N.W.
702 (1933), providing that anyone who files a false financial statement with the Secretary of
State is guilty of crime. For further examples, see Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM.
L. REV. 55, 84-88 (1983).
133. See supra note 117.
134. See S. TOLL, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE ANNOTATED 314 (1974).
135. Lord Diplock in Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] A.C. 132, 165, quoted in Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 913, at 955.
and protecting innocent men from severe and unmerited punishment.
In attempting to satisfy both these goals, legislatures enacted rape
laws which inquired into the victim's prior sexual activities and em-
phasized her behavior during the assault - an emphasis often re-
sulting in rape victims feeling as though they were on trial.
Rape reform legislation of the past decade has changed the fo-
cus of the laws from the victim to the defendant. Some rape laws
now provide that a woman no longer need prove that she resisted her
attacker to obtain a conviction. While this reform eliminates an ob-
stacle to convicting a rapist, it also increases the likelihood that an
innocent man will be punished. The mistake of fact defense reduces
this likelihood, but questions remain on what form the mistake must
take.
Current rape laws also fail to adequately distinguish more seri-
ous conduct from conduct that is less culpable. Those jurisdictions
which do not recognize that a defendant's unreasonably held belief
that his victim consented constitutes a defense to rape punish that
defendant just as severely as they punish the rapist who intentionally
brutalizes his victim. Other jurisdictions, which recognize the unrea-
sonable mistake of fact defense, treat the defendant as leniently as
they treat the man whose mistake was reasonable. By providing pen-
alties which are too severe or failing to assess any penalty at all,
current rape laws afford no means of justly punishing the defendant
who unreasonably believes that a woman consents to intercourse.
Consequently, the defendant who makes an unreasonable mistake of
fact regarding consent may be treated identically to the defendant
who makes a reasonable mistake, and be completely exculpated.
Rape laws must be reformed to include provisions which assess
adequate punishment, neither too harsh nor too lenient, upon the un-
reasonably mistaken defendant. Until these reforms are made, the
law will continue to provide an excuse for defendants who force
themselves upon unwilling women under circumstances in which no
reasonable man would consider such conduct.
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